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1

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a3(2)(j)(2001)(pour-over civil jurisdiction).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issue is presented on appeal:
Whether the District Court erred in summarily enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties,
when there was a clear dispute between Barnes and Lagoon's adjuster whether there had ever been
a settlement. The standard of review is de novo: "Because the trial court took no extrinsic evidence,
we review for correctness." Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
There are no determinative statutes or rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from summary judgment in favor of Lagoon enforcing a purported

settlement agreement.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Barnes sued Lagoon for injuries she received while sliding down a water slide. Lagoon filed

a motion to summarily enforce a purported settlement agreement under Utah R. Civ. P. 7. The
motion was granted, and this appeal followed.
3.

Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal
Barnes was a patron at Lagoon. She decided to slide down a water slide and climbed to the

top. (R. 2, f7). At the top, an employee of Lagoon was controlling the timing and spacing of the
2

water slide patrons as they went down the slide. (Id., at f8). Barnes slid down the slide at the
direction of Lagoon's employee. (Id., at |10). Before Barnes reached the bottom of the slide, she was
struck from behind by another patron, causing her serious and permanent injury. (Id., fl 1). Barnes
ultimately incurred over $40,000.00 in medical bills for surgery and other treatment for her injuries,
and lost wages exceeding $10,000.00. (R. 60-1, ^fl2-13).
Undisputed Facts:
The following facts were undisputed before the trial court. After her injury, on July 7,2000,
Barnes contacted Lagoon about medical coverage to pay for her medical bills. (R. 59, p ; R. 19, ^[2).
Barnes then mailed a letter to Lagoon on October 4,2000, describing the incident and detailing her
medical expenses ($1,641.00). (R. 19, |3). Barnes was then contacted by an adjuster from Lagoon.
(R. 19, f4). Lagoon's adjuster offered her $2,000.00 to settle any claims Barnes might make. (Id.)
Lagoon's adjuster sent a check for $2,000.00, which Barnes ultimately returned, uncashed. (R. 19,
f4; R. 60, T|6). Over the next several years, Barnes had back surgery, and incurred over $40,000.00
in medical bills. (R. 60-1,1(12-13).
Lagoon's Version of the Facts:
Lagoon submitted an affidavit alleging that Barnes had agreed to settle for $2,500.00. (R. 20,
\6)) Lagoon claimed to have sent a check and release for $2,000.00. (Id.) Despite claiming that
Barnes had agreed to settle for $2,500.00, Lagoon admitted that it never sent a check for the
additional $500.00 it had agreed to pay Barnes. Further, Lagoon admitted that Barnes never signed
a release or cashed the $2,000.00 check. (R. 20, ^|7). Lagoon took the position, instead, that Barnes

*Lagoon also contended that Barnes had accepted a prior settlement of $2,000.00. (R. 19,
^|4). Barnes denied that she had ever agreed to settle for that. (R. 60, f 6, 7). The trial court and
Lagoon did not purport to enforce that disputed settlement.
3

was required to sign a release for $2,000.00 and return it, after which Lagoon, despite having been
released in writing for $2,000.00, would then send an additional $500.00. (R. 20, f6).
Eventually, Barnes contacted an attorney in Idaho, Greg Maeser. (Id.) Mr. Maeser was told
that there was a settlement agreement for $2,500.00. (R. 20, ^8). Later, Barnes retained present
counsel to discuss settlement. (R. 20, ^9). Because Mr. Maeser and present counsel did not agree that
there was an enforceable settlement agreement, this action was filed.
Barnes Version of the Facts:
Barnes averred that it was Lagoon, through its representatives, that kept steering the
conversation to settling the claim on a final basis. (R. 59, ^[4). Barnes averred that this was never her
intention (i.e., to settle on a full and final basis) when she contacted Lagoon. (Id.) Barnes instead
offered to settle with Lagoon, if they would agree to pay her expenses, including medical bills and
loss of wages. This is what Barnes wanted, was an agreement from Lagoon to pay these expenses.
(R. 60, %5). Lagoon kept offering, instead, to pay a set amount, for a full and final settlement.
Finally, Lagoon offered $2,000.00, and sent Barnes a check in that amount. Barnes said she would
think about it. (Id., ^6). After thinking about it, Barnes did not feel physically well or good about
settling on a final basis, as she was worried about my future medical bills. Barnes told Lagoon this.
(Id., f7).
Instead, Barnes asked for $5,000.00. Lagoon verbally agreed to an additional $500.00.
Lagoon was to send a second check for that amount. Barnes did not sign anything in writing due
to the fact Lagoon did not uphold their verbal agreement. In the meantime, Barnes received more
physical therapy and was worried about future expenses. (Id., ^8). The only check Barnes ever
received from Lagoon was for $2,000.00. She noticed that it contained a notation that if she cashed
4

it, it was "full payment of all claims". This was not her understanding, so she never cashed it. (Id.,
19).
Barnes averred that she was never sent an additional $500.00 or anything in writing from
Lagoon that they would agree to pay $2,500.00 to settle after they agreed to the $500.00. If Barnes
had gotten such a settlement agreement, she averred that she would have consulted an attorney to
review it. Since she never got such a document, she averred that she never had to decide whether to
settle for that amount. (Id., f 10). Barnes further averred that had she been sent an additional $500.00
check, she would have consulted an attorney to decide whether to settle for that amount. Since she
never got the remaining $500.00 that Lagoon wanted to pay her, she never had to decide whether to
settle for that amount. (Id., f 11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court improperly decided the disputed issue, whether there was a binding agreement
for $2,500.00, on the basis of affidavits, without an evidentiary hearing. A motion for summary
enforcement of a settlement agreement should be handled in the same manner as a motion for
summary judgment. If there are disputed issues of fact, they should be either sent to a jury or
reserved for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court did neither. There was never anything in writing
from Lagoon to document an agreement for $2,500.00. Barnes never signed anything to settle for
any amount. Lagoon claimed it was strictly an oral agreement between its adjuster and Barnes.
Barnes affidavit, essentially, states that she thought Lagoon was going to send her an additional
$500.00, after which she would decide whether to settle. Whether there was ever an agreement to
settle for $2,500.00 was obviously a disputed issue of material fact.
Further, the trial court erred in deciding that Lagoon could send the additional $500.00 that
5

Lagoon admitted that it had never sent Barnes, in December, 2004, over four (4) years after the
purported original oral settlement agreement. Even if there was a binding settlement agreement for
$2,500.00, Lagoon admittedly never sent Barnes a release or a check in that amount. Instead, it relied
upon the prior check for $2,000.00 that it sent in October, 2000. A performance of a contract must
be tendered within a reasonable time. Four (4) years is not a reasonable time to tender a specific sum
of money to settle a claim. The trial court's conclusion otherwise is error.

ARGUMENT
A.
THERE IS A JURY QUESTION WHETHER LAGOON AND BARNES
EVER AGREED TO SETTLE FOR $2,000.00
Lagoon concedes that "[i]t is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features
of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its
terms are indefinite". Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT, f l l , 78 P.3d 600. Essentially, this is a
motion for summary judgment. The facts must therefore be viewed in a light most favorable to
Barnes. Ultimately, it will be up to a jury to decide whether a settlement agreement was reached, and
if it was reached, whether Lagoon breached that agreement by failing to ever pay the full amount
agreed upon.
There is no evidence from Barnes that a settlement was ever reached. Lagoon only offers its
own internal notes, and the self-serving statements of its adjusters. Barnes offers her affidavit, to the
contrary. The only written evidence from Barnes is a letter to Lagoon which states: "I am asking that
Lagoon cover my expenses for this preventable accident". This was her offer. Lagoon did not agree
to this offer. Instead, it offered $2,000.00 for a full and final settlement, by way of a check. Barnes
6

did not accept this offer, which was conditioned on her taking that amount as a "full payment of all
claims". Barnes made a counteroffer, which was $5,000.00. Lagoon did not accept that counteroffer,
but proposed a $2,500.00 settlement. Lagoon never sent Barnes the remaining $500.00. Several years
went by, more than a reasonable time for tendering the remaining money, and Barnes contacted
counsel for assistance.
Had Barnes cashed the check, a contract for settlement would have been created. Barnes
refused to cash the check, which was the same as refusing the offer. Had Lagoon sent any other
release documents, perhaps more might be inferred. However, all it ever sent Barnes was a check,
for $500.00 less than what it contends was the settlement amount. Lagoon's memorandum suggests
that a release in the amount of $2,500.00 had been sent to Barnes, and that the only thing left was
for her to send it back and get the remaining $500.00. This is not correct. Lagoon never sent a release
to Barnes. There was never any written commitment on Lagoon's part to pay $2,500.00. The only
written communication to Barnes was a $2,000.00 check, which Lagoon admits Barnes never cashed.
The only evidence of a contract for $2,500.00 before the court is internal notes made by Lagoon.
There are no documents that were ever sent to Barnes to commit Lagoon to this offer. There are no
documents from Barnes agreeing to settle for $2,500.00. All the court has before it is a party's
internal notes to evidence a binding contract. Whether or not these notes are ultimately admissible,
they certainly are not binding on Barnes, who never saw them, and who never received any written
settlement agreement for $2,500.00.
Lagoon contended, and the trial court agreed, that a settlement agreement could be summarily
enforced without an evidentiary hearing. (R., 83). This was error. A settlement agreement can only
be summarily enforced if there are no factual issues requiring an evidentiary hearing:
7

Yet it is apparent that the summary procedure for enforcement of unperformed
settlement contracts is not a panacea for the myriad types of problems that may arise.
The summary procedure is admirably suited to situations where, for example, a
binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown, and the excuse for nonperformance
is comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is ill-suited to situations
presenting complex factual issues related either to the formation or the
consummation of the contract, which only testimonial exploration in a more plenary
hearing is apt to satisfactorily resolve.
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605,609 (1979)(emphasis added). Accord,
Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1995)(refusing to enforce settlement agreement due to dispute
over term of contract).
The closest case, factually, to the instant case, is Murray v. State of Utah, 731 P.2d 1000
(Utah 1987). In Murray, a personal injury (wrongful death) case, however, both parties were
represented by counsel. It was undisputed that a settlement was reached between attorneys. Both a
check and a release memorializing the settlement were sent within a few days, but were returned
unsigned. There was no argument that settlement had not been reached, only that plaintiff had
"changed her mind"; in fact, counsel for the surviving widow conceded at oral argument before the
Utah Supreme Court that a settlement had been reached. Under these facts, certainly, there was no
dispute that there was a settlement and summary enforcement was appropriate. However, here, all
we have are oral communications between an injured person and a lay adjuster, none of which are
documented with a contemporaneous letter. All that was ever sent by the defendant was a check with
a restrictive endorsement, never cashed. The adjuster and the plaintiff disagree as to whether the
check was merely an offer, or whether a settlement was actually reached.

B.
BY WAITING FOUR YEARS, LAGOON'S WAITED
8

AN UNREASONABLE TIME TO TENDER THE FULL $2,500.00
Even if there was an oral agreement to settle for $2,500.00, Lagoon waited an unreasonable
amount of time to tender it. In October, 2000, Lagoon tendered a check for $2,000.00 which
contained a restrictive endorsement that "acceptance signifies full payment of all claims". The only
time Lagoon ever tendered a check for $2,500.00, the purported settlement amount, was after the
trial court enforced the settlement in December, 2004. Four years is an unreasonable amount of time.

See Dent v. Dent, 870 P.2d 280 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(no time limit in decree of divorce for
husband's option to match offer on sale of home; option "effective only for a reasonable time");
accord, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852 (Utah 1998)("if a contract fails to specify a
time of performance the law implies that it shall be done within a reasonable time under the
circumstances").
The trial court finessed this problem in two ways. First, it construed cashing the $2,000.00
check, with the restrictive endorsement "full payment of all claims", as a "condition precedent" to
Lagoon's tender of an additional $500.00. The problem is that once Barnes cashed that $2,000.00
check, it would have constitued a binding settlement for $2,000.00. Any prior oral agreement would
have been essentially merged into the cashing of the $2,000.00 check. Further, there was no evidence
in writing from Lagoon stating that cashing the $2,000.00 check was a condition precedent. There
was no evidence from Barnes that she understood it that way.
The second way around the four year delay was by the trial court's focus on the time between
October, 2000, and February, 2001, when Lagoon demanded that Barnes perform by returning a
(non-existent) release for $2,500.00. But the question isn't Barnes' performance. The question is
9

Lagoon's performance. Barnes was not required to perform before Lagoon. It was the other way
around. Lagoon had to submit the settlement agreement to Barnes by way of either a release or check
in the amount of $2,500.00, within a reasonable time.
Neither scenario is correct. The trial court was obviously reaching for a way around Lagoon's
obvious unreasonable delay, and it reached too far.

10

CONCLUSION
Utah has recognized that settlement agreements are treated like any other contract. If there
is no genuine issue of material fact surrounding the formation or performance of the settlement
agreement, then it is enforced in the ordinary fashion. If there are genuine issues of material fact, the
trial court must submit those issues to the trier of fact. Here, Lagoon claimed an oral $2,500.00
settlement, but only sent a check for $2,000.00 that "acceptance signifies full payment of all
claims".. Barnes said that she only agreed to think about it, but never received the $2,500.00, or an
additional $500.00 either. There is clearly a disputed issue of material fact, that should go to a jury.
Even if it is clear that the parties agreed to settle for $2,500.00, Lagoon was required to
tender, not a check for $2,000.00 with an endorsement that "acceptance signifies full payment of all
claims". It was required to either send a check for $2,500.00 (and stop payment on the other
$2,000.00 check), or send another check for $500.00 within a reasonable time. It did neither until
four years later, after the trial court had ruled to enforce the settlement. This is clearly error. The case
should be reversed and sent back for a trial on the issues.
DATED THIS 1st day of August, 2005.

Daniel F. Bertch
Kevin K. Robson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
f

I hereby certify that on this _J

day of August, 2005,1 served a true and correct copy of

the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, and by deposit in first class mail, postage prepaid to the
following counsel of record:
Brian P. Miller
Sam Harkness
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
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ADDENDUM
A
ORDER ENFORCING SETTLEMENT
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JILLENE BARNES,
RULING ON DEFENDANT LAGOON'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
LAGOON CORPORATION, INC., a Utah
Corporation, and JOHN DOES I-V,

Case No. 040700166
Judge MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on defendant Lagoon Corporation's Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers and heard
oral arguments from attorneys for both parties. For the following reasons, the Court finds that
the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. The Court orders the defendant to
reissue to the plaintiff a new check for the full amount of $2500 within thirty days of this Order
and also orders the plaintiff to execute and deliver to the defendant a release in defendant's favor
within two weeks of receipt of the check.
BACKGROUND
This concerns injuries the plaintiff allegedly sustained while a patron at the defendant's
water slide. On July 1, 2000, the plaintiff was waiting to slide down the water slide while

another patron waited to go down after her. At the defendant's employee's direction, the plaintiff
began down the slide. Before the plaintiff reached die bottom of the slide, the patron who had
been standing behind her at the top of the slide, collided with the plaintiff, sliding into her from
behind.
On July 7, 2000, the plaintiff phoned Lynette Small, defendant's employee in the Loss
Prevention Office, and explained her allegations and claimed injuries. On October 4, 2000,
about three months after calling the defendant, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant detailing
her account of the events and injury-related expenses. On October 10, 2000, R.C. Fussner,
defendant's Director of Loss Prevention, called the plaintiff after receiving a copy of her letter.
The plaintiff and Mr. Fussner discussed the plaintiffs allegations and he offered to settle the
matter for $2000 to which the plaintiff agreed. He stated he would send her a check for $2000
and a release for her to execute.
On October 20, 2000, however, the plaintiff called Mr. Fussner and stated that $2000
would no longer be enough, but that $5000 would be acceptable. Despite the plaintiffs previous
agreement to settle for $2000, Mr. Fussner offered an additional $500 to settle. The plaintiff
accepted the additional $500, whereupon Mr. Fussner said he would send the additional $500
upon receipt of her release. The plaintiff said she would sign the release and return a copy to
him; she never cashed the $2000 check nor signed a release. The next contact the defendant had
with the plaintiff was when her attorney contacted the defendant on February 1, 2001.
ANALYSIS
A court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement without an evidentiary hearing.
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 609 (Utah 1979). After reviewing
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the pleadings and supporting documents, and hearing oral arguments, it is apparent to the Court
that the plaintiff entered into a valid settlement agreement. The defendant made an offer to settle
the plaintiffs alleged claims, the plaintiff accepted the defendant's offer, there was valid
consideration on the part of both parties, see Golden Key Realty v. Manta, 699 P.2d 730, 732
(Utah 1985) (holding that essential elements of a valid contract include "offer and acceptance,
competent parties, and consideration."), and the terms and conditions of their oral agreement
were "sufficiently definite to allow it to be enforced." Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17,ffif28, 71
P.3d589.
In his affidavit, Mr. Fussner affirms that when the plaintiff spoke with him, she expressed
a desire to "resolve the matter quickly." He offered to settle all of her claims for $2000, to which
the plaintiff agreed. Later, he offered an additional $500, despite the plaintiff having previously
agreed to settle for $2000. He affirms that the plaintiff agreed to those terms-$2500 in exchange
for a release of all of the plaintiffs claims allegedly arising from the July 1, 2000 incident. The
parties' oral agreement has the essential elements of a binding settlement.
The plaintiff claims that she did not agree to nor intend to settle for $2500 and that she
merely agreed to "think about it." This claim is unlikely given the plaintiffs own statements. In
her letter of October 4, 2000, she wrote: "I am asking that Lagoon cover my expenses for this
preventable accident"; "I am submitting these bills to you in hope that we can resolve this
matter"; and "I am anxious to resolve this. Please contact me . . .." It is clear that the plaintiff
intended to settle. Also, in her own affidavit, she contradicts her claims that she did not intend to
settle. She first affirms that the defendant "kept steering the conversation to settling the claim on
a final basis. This was never my intention when I first contacted Lagoon." She later states,
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however, that "I offered to settle with Lagoon if they would agree to pay my expenses, including
medical bills and loss of wages. This is what I wanted, was an agreement from Lagoon to pay
these expenses" That is exactly what Lagoon agreed to pay. The October 4, 200 letter listed
some $1,640.62 in expenses for doctors' bills, hospital and ambulance bills, x-ray bills, and
amounts for her co-pays. She also included $893 for lost wages and clearly stated she was
"anxious to resolve this." Her affidavit also shows she intended to and did settle.
The plaintiff argues that the terms of the oral contract are not clear. She claims that when
she stated she wanted the defendant to pay her "expenses, including medical bills", she meant
not the limited amount she set forth in her letter, but all of her medical bills, including those
which she incurred after October and those in the future. This, however, appears an incredible
explanation. Her own attorney's letter shows she indeed settled for a sum at least near the
$1,640.62 for which she asked. In his letter of March 10, 2003 to Lagoon, he states that if the
plaintiff had cashed the $2000 check, then "she would settle for less than the $2500 agreed
upon." He states that she sought legal counsel because Lagoon "failed to perform the settlement.
She assume[d] that Lagoon decided not to settle for $2500 . . . ." The plaintiffs own letter
shows she intended the terms of the settlement to include merely the expenses she had detailed
because she was "anxious to resolve" the matter. If she was anxious to resolve the matter, it
seems reasonable that she would not want to drag out her dealings with the defendant by asking
them to continually pay for her expenses. Finally, in her own affidavit, she admits that the
defendant was to send a second check for $500, that it never sent the additional $500, and that
Lagoon "did not uphold their verbal agreement", etc. The defendant argues, and the Court
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agrees, that the defendant would not send-and the plaintiff would not expect, checks for $2000
and $500 without there having been a clear and definite settlement agreement.
It also seems apparent that the defendant was to send the additional $500 once it received
the plaintiffs executed release. This was merely a condition precedent the parties set prior to the
defendant assenting to a new contract with an additional $500; if the plaintiff did not follow
through, then she would not get the extra $500 and stay with the original $2000. As it was a
condition precedent in favor of the defendant, it could only be waived by the defendant. Foster
v. Montgomery, 2003 UTApp 405,ffif23, 82 P.3d 191. In sum, the terms of the oral agreement
are sufficiently definite to be enforced.
The plaintiff argues that she did not sign a release and so the contract is not binding. "[I]f
a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract," however, "a subsequent failure
to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract." Lawrence Constr.Co. v.
Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982). Also, the plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds
that she was to send the release before the defendant was to send the additional $500, too long of
a time has run to enforce the agreement. "Parties have no right," however, "to welch on a
settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is struck and
when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation." Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333,
336 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Given the length of time that passed from the time of the accident to
the first letter the plaintiff sent to the defendant, the fact that the defendant waited from midOctober 2000 until the plaintiffs attorney contacted it in February 2001 for the plaintiffs release
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does not seem like an unreasonable time to wait for the plaintiff to perform her side of the
agreement.
Signed this December

r
fi

, 2004,

)ISTRICT COURT
MICHAEL G. ALLP:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I sent a copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT LAGOON'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT to the following, postage pre-paid,
December
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,2004:

DANIEL F BERTCH
BERTCH ROBSON
1996 EAST 6400 SOUTH SUITE 100
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84121
BRIAN P MILLER
SAM HARKNESS
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11™ FLOOR
POB 45000
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145
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